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Abstract
In a recent edition of this journal, Mannion and Braithwaite provide a succinct analysis of the emergence, and 
ultimately limited impact, of what they term the current ‘Safety I’ movement in healthcare. They describe the arc 
of this field from denial, through engagement via mechanisms and approaches imported from other industries, 
to the current situation where, despite ‘best efforts,’ error rates remain stubbornly recalcitrant.
In examining the failure of system-wide efforts to produce sustained reductions in errors and adverse events, 
that article exposes the doxa, or what Bourdieu calls ‘the taken for granted’ which is central to this latest wave 
of patient safety movement. In this commentary, I would like to take focus on two key elements of Mannion 
and Braithwaite’s argument: that harm is caused by misguided but otherwise well-intentioned actions and 
the ‘embracing’ of patient safety. I then conclude by briefly considering the implications of these for Safety II, 
particularly as envisaged by the authors as an evolutionary, and therefore linear progression, from Safety I.
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Introduction
At the core of the current patient safety movement is the 
Socratic claim that no-one errs willingly.1 This assertion 
has provided a, if not the, foundational principal in what is 
presented as the transition from a socially mediated ‘shame 
and blame’ response to errors, to the current techno-rational 
systems approach.2 Attempts at prevention and remediation 
from this positioning have drawn heavily on industries 
such as aviation and mining, including the use of process 
controls, such a checklists.3 For Mannion and Braithwaite 
the importation of such ideas into healthcare are problematic 
because of cultural differences.4 I would argue, however, 
that the process of problematisation needs to go beyond the 
question of context. The positioning of the current patient 
safety movement as a progression from the ‘disciplining’5 of 
the individual to the disciplining of ‘the system’ operates to 
masks the continued impact of managerial and professional 
power relations.6 This includes the continuation of the blame 
and shame culture7 not just for those who err but, in numerous 
instances, those who attempt to prevent or mitigate the errors 
themselves.8
The Notion of Misguided but Well-Intended Actions 
Causing Harm
Three separate issues arise from the argument that errors are 
the result of misguided but well-intentioned actions. First, the 
notion of ‘misguided’ asserts that individuals causing harm 
simply did not know better. The clinicians are said to be ‘doing 
their best’ so that errors when they arise, are not the result of 
an individual’s desire to harm, but rather a by-product of gaps 
in the system, Reason’s famous ‘swiss-cheese’ model.9
To somewhat torture the metaphor, what this model fails to 
address is the cheese around the gaps are as important as the 
gaps themselves. If the gaps allow the errors occur, then the 
cheese is what allows the gaps to occur. The persistence of 
errors, across countries and centuries, speaks to collective 
behaviour that is allowed to persist despite irrefutable 
evidence of significant harm and therefore seemingly beyond 
mechanistic solutions, current improvement strategies, all 
the way up to and including regulatory frameworks and 
convictions.10 Even given the multiple factors contributing to 
individual types of harm, their persistence despite all efforts 
would indicate the issue is not the gaps, but the cheese. One of 
the latest large-scale patient safety inquiries, that of the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, highlighted the lack of 
leadership and compassion,11 and not of knowledge, in the 
“… appalling standards of personal care and neglect at some 
hospitals and care home”12 (p.115).
The failure to gain significant improvements in hand hygiene 
rates13 is another case in point. Semmelweis,14 sought not 
only to avoid doing harm, but to prevent harm being done. 
The distinction is important. His personal experience of 
professional marginalization and abuse echoes in the present 
through the experience of whistle-blowers including Stephen 
Bolsin in the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry15 and in many 
cases since.8 
Second, the general claim of ‘well-intentioned’ interventions 
that unwittingly or unwillingly cause harm bears further 
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critique. Medicine cannot and should not be allowed to 
distance itself from the large-scale iatrogenic harm caused 
to vulnerable individuals and populations in the past, and to 
date. The preeminent role of health professionals in torture 
and mass murder during WWII (within the living memory of 
survivors and with continued impact on their families),16 the 
Tuskegee (and various similar) ‘experiment(s)’ undertaken 
by clinicians and rationalized as being for ‘the greater good,’17 
the actions of some clinicians in disaster settings,18 amongst 
many other systematic and sustained interventions which 
cause(d) harm for ideological reasons belies this ethically 
naive assumption. Similarly, arguments that these type of 
events are either mainly historical and or exceptional can be 
directly countered by the active participation of health care 
professionals in the sterilization of people with disabilities 
without their consent19 and in efforts to ‘convert’ the sexual 
orientation and identity of individuals20 which continue to 
date. 
Third, unpacking the discourse around the well-meaning 
individual contrasted with the ‘bad apple’ not only highlights 
the use of ‘bad apples’ as scapegoats but exposes the 
mechanism of distancing the ‘good many’ in contrast to the 
lone (bad) individual. The ‘bad apple’ argument operates to 
reinforce the Socratic doxa. 
There is clearly no doubt, for example, that Harold Shipman 
was a mass murderer, but his murders were conducted within 
the context of his daily medical practice. His actions were 
not hidden, they were unheeded. Early warning signs (such 
as the forging of prescriptions) were minimized or ignored 
by multiple colleagues and authorities, including the General 
Medical Council and the police.21 The social fact that his 
victims were virtually all elderly women, with limited voice 
and value, was largely ignored in the general debate around 
his actions.22 One of his reported rationales, that his victims 
were drains on the resources of the NHS, echoes the symbolic 
violence implicit in the continued descriptions of patients, 
and in particular elderly patients, as ‘bed blockers.’23 Indeed, 
as Harris notes, it was following the Shipman case that “… 
medical educators began to argue that retaining the concept of 
altruism did a disservice to the medical profession where ‘it is 
the claim of altruism that allows the medical profession to claim 
moral superiority’”24 (p. 3).
Shipman’s actions were extreme, but his reasoning, however 
utterly deluded, may have been drawn from standard health 
service discourse. Certainly, similar language pervades a 
variety of health, ageing and disability discourses that are in 
no way viewed as exceptional.
Medical Professionals Have Embraced the Patient Safety 
Movement
Mannion and Braithwaite also make the argument that 
the medical profession had rejected, then accepted, and 
now embraced the patient safety agenda. An alternative 
interpretation of this trajectory is to see this ‘embracing’ as 
a mechanism for control of the patient safety agenda. From 
its emergence, the patient safety movement has largely been 
shaped by those whose perspectives are embedded within 
specific disciplines and power relations.6 
The World Health Organisation’s first Patient Safety 
Curriculum Guide published in 2009,25 for example, was 
produced for medical schools. Given that there are more 
than double the number of nurses compared to doctors 
worldwide,26 the rationale was clearly not prioritised on the 
basis of workforce numbers. The second Curriculum Guide, 
published in 2011 was entitled ‘Multi-Professional,’ in other 
words ‘everyone else.’27 
What then would patient safety agenda look like if the 
discourse of patient safety practice and education was led by 
patients, the public, survivors of errors, community mental 
health nurses, nutritionists, social workers or receptionists? 
A recent comparison of patient and regulators’ view on 
quality, for example, concluded that “The predominant clinical 
approach taken by regulators does not match the patients’ 
perspective of what is relevant for healthcare quality … patients 
seem to be more tolerant of what they perceive to be clinical or 
management errors than of perceived relational deficiencies in 
care providers. If regulators want to give patients a voice, they 
should expand their horizon beyond the medical framework.”28
Can Safety II Disturb the Doxa?
Mannion and Braithwaite conclude their editorial by making 
an argument for an evolution from Safety I to Safety II.29 This 
approach is in line with a more general move across industries 
towards the use of positive psychology30 and appreciative 
inquiry31 as a way of addressing errors in organisations. There 
is no reason to believe, given the homeostasis achieved under 
Safety I, that Safety II could not provide fresh insights and 
new approaches to improving reducing errors and improving 
safety. To do so, however, it has to disrupt more than the doxa, 
to question not only what is done wrong compared to what is 
done right, or even linear versus complexity approaches, but 
will remain once this evolutionary leap has been achieved.
If Safety II is to succeed where Safety I failed, it needs to 
question not only the ontology, but the epistemology and 
ethics of the patient safety movement. Looking for successes 
over failures is only one part of the equation. The substantive 
human fault lines remain, whatever perspective is taken on 
the problem. Somewhere between the culpable and reckless 
individual and the unwilling agent of a deterministic culture 
lies the daily practice(s) of highly trained (including in patient 
safety) healthcare professionals.32 Yet as Dixon Woods has 
shown “staff [do] not always do the right things, for a wide 
range of different reasons, including contestations about what 
counted as the right thing”33 (p. 11). These are people whose 
practice is generated within culture(s) which continue to 
reward and punish, promote and supress. Bad apples are 
castigated, but so too are whistle-blowers, and while clinicians 
may not intend to cause errors, the system is constituted by 
people who individually and collectively make daily choices 
which can and do directly contribute to iatrogenic harm. In 
other words, in shifting the focus, Safety II must also change 
the doxa, directly exposing the assumptions, presumption 
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